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1 ---
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2 layout: page
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3 title: RPC Protocol
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4 ---
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5
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6 # RPC Protocol
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7
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8 ## Introduction
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9
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10 ### Time Travel! _(Promise Pipelining)_
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11
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12 <img src='images/time-travel.png' style='max-width:639px'>
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13
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14 Cap'n Proto RPC employs TIME TRAVEL! The results of an RPC call are returned to the client
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15 instantly, before the server even receives the initial request!
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16
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17 There is, of course, a catch: The results can only be used as part of a new request sent to the
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18 same server. If you want to use the results for anything else, you must wait.
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19
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20 This is useful, however: Say that, as in the picture, you want to call `foo()`, then call `bar()`
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21 on its result, i.e. `bar(foo())`. Or -- as is very common in object-oriented programming -- you
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22 want to call a method on the result of another call, i.e. `foo().bar()`. With any traditional RPC
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23 system, this will require two network round trips. With Cap'n Proto, it takes only one. In fact,
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24 you can chain any number of such calls together -- with diamond dependencies and everything -- and
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25 Cap'n Proto will collapse them all into one round trip.
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26
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27 By now you can probably imagine how it works: if you execute `bar(foo())`, the client sends two
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28 messages to the server, one saying "Please execute foo()", and a second saying "Please execute
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29 bar() on the result of the first call". These messages can be sent together -- there's no need
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30 to wait for the first call to actually return.
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31
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32 To make programming to this model easy, in your code, each call returns a "promise". Promises
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33 work much like Javascript promises or promises/futures in other languages: the promise is returned
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34 immediately, but you must later call `wait()` on it, or call `then()` to register an asynchronous
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35 callback.
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36
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37 However, Cap'n Proto promises support an additional feature:
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38 [pipelining](http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/pipeline.html). The promise
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39 actually has methods corresponding to whatever methods the final result would have, except that
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40 these methods may only be used for the purpose of calling back to the server. Moreover, a
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41 pipelined promise can be used in the parameters to another call without waiting.
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42
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43 **_But isn't that just syntax sugar?_**
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44
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45 OK, fair enough. In a traditional RPC system, we might solve our problem by introducing a new
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46 method `foobar()` which combines `foo()` and `bar()`. Now we've eliminated the round trip, without
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47 inventing a whole new RPC protocol.
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48
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49 The problem is, this kind of arbitrary combining of orthogonal features quickly turns elegant
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50 object-oriented protocols into ad-hoc messes.
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51
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52 For example, consider the following interface:
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53
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54 {% highlight capnp %}
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55 # A happy, object-oriented interface!
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56
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57 interface Node {}
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58
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59 interface Directory extends(Node) {
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60 list @0 () -> (list: List(Entry));
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61 struct Entry {
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62 name @0 :Text;
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63 file @1 :Node;
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64 }
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65
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66 create @1 (name :Text) -> (node :Node);
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67 open @2 (name :Text) -> (node :Node);
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68 delete @3 (name :Text);
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69 link @4 (name :Text, node :Node);
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70 }
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71
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72 interface File extends(Node) {
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73 size @0 () -> (size: UInt64);
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74 read @1 (startAt :UInt64, amount :UInt64) -> (data: Data);
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75 write @2 (startAt :UInt64, data :Data);
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76 truncate @3 (size :UInt64);
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77 }
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78 {% endhighlight %}
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79
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80 This is a very clean interface for interacting with a file system. But say you are using this
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81 interface over a satellite link with 1000ms latency. Now you have a problem: simply reading the
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82 file `foo` in directory `bar` takes four round trips!
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83
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84 {% highlight python %}
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85 # pseudocode
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86 bar = root.open("bar"); # 1
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87 foo = bar.open("foo"); # 2
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88 size = foo.size(); # 3
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89 data = foo.read(0, size); # 4
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90 # The above is four calls but takes only one network
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91 # round trip with Cap'n Proto!
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92 {% endhighlight %}
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93
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94 In such a high-latency scenario, making your interface elegant is simply not worth 4x the latency.
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95 So now you're going to change it. You'll probably do something like:
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96
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97 * Introduce a notion of path strings, so that you can specify "foo/bar" rather than make two
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98 separate calls.
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99 * Merge the `File` and `Directory` interfaces into a single `Filesystem` interface, where every
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100 call takes a path as an argument.
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101
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102 {% highlight capnp %}
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103 # A sad, singleton-ish interface.
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104
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105 interface Filesystem {
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106 list @0 (path :Text) -> (list :List(Text));
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107 create @1 (path :Text, data :Data);
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108 delete @2 (path :Text);
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109 link @3 (path :Text, target :Text);
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110
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111 fileSize @4 (path :Text) -> (size: UInt64);
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112 read @5 (path :Text, startAt :UInt64, amount :UInt64)
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113 -> (data :Data);
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114 readAll @6 (path :Text) -> (data: Data);
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115 write @7 (path :Text, startAt :UInt64, data :Data);
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116 truncate @8 (path :Text, size :UInt64);
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117 }
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118 {% endhighlight %}
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119
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120 We've now solved our latency problem... but at what cost?
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121
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122 * We now have to implement path string manipulation, which is always a headache.
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123 * If someone wants to perform multiple operations on a file or directory, we now either have to
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124 re-allocate resources for every call or we have to implement some sort of cache, which tends to
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125 be complicated and error-prone.
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126 * We can no longer give someone a specific `File` or a `Directory` -- we have to give them a
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127 `Filesystem` and a path.
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128 * But what if they are buggy and have hard-coded some path other than the one we specified?
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129 * Or what if we don't trust them, and we really want them to access only one particular `File` or
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130 `Directory` and not have permission to anything else. Now we have to implement authentication
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131 and authorization systems! Arrgghh!
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132
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133 Essentially, in our quest to avoid latency, we've resorted to using a singleton-ish design, and
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134 [singletons are evil](http://www.object-oriented-security.org/lets-argue/singletons).
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135
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136 **Promise Pipelining solves all of this!**
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137
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138 With pipelining, our 4-step example can be automatically reduced to a single round trip with no
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139 need to change our interface at all. We keep our simple, elegant, singleton-free interface, we
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140 don't have to implement path strings, caching, authentication, or authorization, and yet everything
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141 performs as well as we can possibly hope for.
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142
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143 #### Example code
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144
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145 [The calculator example](https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/blob/master/c++/samples/calculator-client.c++)
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146 uses promise pipelining. Take a look at the client side in particular.
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147
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148 ### Distributed Objects
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149
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150 As you've noticed by now, Cap'n Proto RPC is a distributed object protocol. Interface references --
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151 or, as we more commonly call them, capabilities -- are a first-class type. You can pass a
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152 capability as a parameter to a method or embed it in a struct or list. This is a huge difference
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153 from many modern RPC-over-HTTP protocols that only let you address global URLs, or other RPC
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154 systems like Protocol Buffers and Thrift that only let you address singleton objects exported at
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155 startup. The ability to dynamically introduce new objects and pass around references to them
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156 allows you to use the same design patterns over the network that you use locally in object-oriented
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157 programming languages. Many kinds of interactions become vastly easier to express given the
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158 richer vocabulary.
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159
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160 **_Didn't CORBA prove this doesn't work?_**
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161
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162 No!
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163
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164 CORBA failed for many reasons, with the usual problems of design-by-committee being a big one.
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165
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166 However, the biggest reason for CORBA's failure is that it tried to make remote calls look the
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167 same as local calls. Cap'n Proto does NOT do this -- remote calls have a different kind of API
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168 involving promises, and accounts for the presence of a network introducing latency and
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169 unreliability.
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170
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171 As shown above, promise pipelining is absolutely critical to making object-oriented interfaces work
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172 in the presence of latency. If remote calls look the same as local calls, there is no opportunity
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173 to introduce promise pipelining, and latency is inevitable. Any distributed object protocol which
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174 does not support promise pipelining cannot -- and should not -- succeed. Thus the failure of CORBA
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175 (and DCOM, etc.) was inevitable, but Cap'n Proto is different.
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176
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177 ### Handling disconnects
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178
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179 Networks are unreliable. Occasionally, connections will be lost. When this happens, all
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180 capabilities (object references) served by the connection will become disconnected. Any further
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181 calls addressed to these capabilities will throw "disconnected" exceptions. When this happens, the
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182 client will need to create a new connection and try again. All Cap'n Proto applications with
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183 long-running connections (and probably short-running ones too) should be prepared to catch
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184 "disconnected" exceptions and respond appropriately.
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185
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186 On the server side, when all references to an object have been "dropped" (either because the
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187 clients explicitly dropped them or because they became disconnected), the object will be closed
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188 (in C++, the destructor is called; in GC'd languages, a `close()` method is called). This allows
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189 servers to easily allocate per-client resources without having to clean up on a timeout or risk
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190 leaking memory.
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191
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192 ### Security
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193
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194 Cap'n Proto interface references are
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195 [capabilities](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security). That is, they both
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196 designate an object to call and confer permission to call it. When a new object is created, only
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197 the creator is initially able to call it. When the object is passed over a network connection,
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198 the receiver gains permission to make calls -- but no one else does. In fact, it is impossible
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199 for others to access the capability without consent of either the host or the receiver because
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200 the host only assigns it an ID specific to the connection over which it was sent.
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201
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202 Capability-based design patterns -- which largely boil down to object-oriented design patterns --
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203 work great with Cap'n Proto. Such patterns tend to be much more adaptable than traditional
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204 ACL-based security, making it easy to keep security tight and avoid confused-deputy attacks while
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205 minimizing pain for legitimate users. That said, you can of course implement ACLs or any other
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206 pattern on top of capabilities.
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207
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208 For an extended discussion of what capabilities are and why they are often easier and more powerful
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209 than ACLs, see Mark Miller's
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210 ["An Ode to the Granovetter Diagram"](http://www.erights.org/elib/capability/ode/index.html) and
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211 [Capability Myths Demolished](http://zesty.ca/capmyths/usenix.pdf).
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212
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213 ## Protocol Features
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214
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215 Cap'n Proto's RPC protocol has the following notable features. Since the protocol is complicated,
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216 the feature set has been divided into numbered "levels", so that implementations may declare which
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217 features they have covered by advertising a level number.
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218
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219 * **Level 1:** Object references and promise pipelining, as described above.
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220 * **Level 2:** Persistent capabilities. You may request to "save" a capability, receiving a
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221 persistent token which can be used to "restore" it in the future (on a new connection). Not
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222 all capabilities can be saved; the host app must implement support for it. Building this into
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223 the protocol makes it possible for a Cap'n-Proto-based data store to transparently save
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224 structures containing capabilities without knowledge of the particular capability types or the
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225 application built on them, as well as potentially enabling more powerful analysis and
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226 visualization of stored data.
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227 * **Level 3:** Three-way interactions. A network of Cap'n Proto vats (nodes) can pass object
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228 references to each other and automatically form direct connections as needed. For instance, if
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229 Alice (on machine A) sends Bob (on machine B) a reference to Carol (on machine C), then machine B
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230 will form a new connection to machine C so that Bob can call Carol directly without proxying
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231 through machine A.
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232 * **Level 4:** Reference equality / joining. If you receive a set of capabilities from different
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233 parties which should all point to the same underlying objects, you can verify securely that they
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234 in fact do. This is subtle, but enables many security patterns that rely on one party being able
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235 to verify that two or more other parties agree on something (imagine a digital escrow agent).
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236 See [E's page on equality](http://erights.org/elib/equality/index.html).
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237
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238 ## Encryption
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239
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240 At this time, Cap'n Proto does not specify an encryption scheme, but as it is a simple byte
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241 stream protocol, it can easily be layered on top of SSL/TLS or other such protocols.
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242
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243 ## Specification
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244
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245 The Cap'n Proto RPC protocol is defined in terms of Cap'n Proto serialization schemas. The
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246 documentation is inline. See
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247 [rpc.capnp](https://github.com/sandstorm-io/capnproto/blob/master/c++/src/capnp/rpc.capnp).
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248
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249 Cap'n Proto's RPC protocol is based heavily on
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250 [CapTP](http://www.erights.org/elib/distrib/captp/index.html), the distributed capability protocol
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251 used by the [E programming language](http://www.erights.org/index.html). Lots of useful material
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252 for understanding capabilities can be found at those links.
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253
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254 The protocol is complex, but the functionality it supports is conceptually simple. Just as TCP
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255 is a complex protocol that implements the simple concept of a byte stream, Cap'n Proto RPC is a
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256 complex protocol that implements the simple concept of objects with callable methods.
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